Background to the current conflict

Historic climate of resistance

Before becoming part of Indonesia, Aceh had been an independent
sultanate with its own currency for several centuries. Even after
being colonized by the Dutch, Aceh experienced a long, resistance
history against colonial power. During the Indonesian war for independence
against the Dutch, Aceh made significant contributions to Indonesia
in terms of material and financial resources. (Siedel, UNHCR WriteNet
Paper, sect. 2)



After subsequent independence of Indonesia in 1949, as a result
of such contributions, Aceh was granted as a ‘special region status’
by President Sukarno after a series of rebellions. This treatment
was supposed to give Aceh great autonomy with regard to religion,
customary law and education in exchange of loyalty. (TAPOL, the
Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, “Aceh emerges from years of state
of terror”)



Despite such an arrangement, however, the status gave autonomy in
name only to Aceh. Its ability to control its policies was nominal.
Local authority was taken over by Indonesian military officers sent
from Jakarta. Traditionally in Aceh, religious leaders, called Ulama,
had administered local districts they were seldom recognized by
soldiers from Jakarta under Indonesian rule.



The discovery of natural gas reserves in Aceh has contributed significantly
to the central government’s revenue since 1970s. However, Aceh itself
has benefited little from its own resources in return. It is estimated
that Aceh has contributed one-third of Indonesia’s oil and gas exports,
as well as timber, rubber, gold and silver production. (Japan Times,
May 25, 2000) On the other hand, Aceh itself in return has received
less than 5 percent of the revenue earned from its own oil. (International
Crisis Group, Asia Report No.17, 3) Oil-related, well-paid jobs
were provided to people from outside of the province, mainly Javanese
and foreigners. The government’s transmigration program exacerbated
economic discrimination between Acehnese and non-Acehnese and helped
broadly nurture a sense of their own resources being exploited by
Jakarta.



Muslim Acehnese account for 98 percent of the population in the
province. Indonesia, on the other hand, is not an Islamic country
despite its largest Muslim population in the world. While 88 percent
of the people are Muslim, Indonesian Islam has allowed liberal practice
of Hinduism, Buddhism and other beliefs. (US Committee for Refugees,
9 September, 1999) This discontent with secular central government
has seemingly remained in Aceh where the Ulama groups have been
active. An independent movement aiming at establishing an Islamic
independent state has grown where a showdown with the government
appears imminent.



Political awakening and growth of anti-Jakarta sentiment



Economic growth after the 1970s has actually facilitated marginalizing
much of the Acehnese, widening the disparity between the affluent
and the poor. (Siedel, sect. 2) The GAM armed movement began to
resurface again in the late 1980s and the 1990s with far wider support
from the local Acehnese. Many exiles began to funnel money and weapons
to the movement, and several hundred Acehnese returned from Libyan
training. (TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, “Aceh Emerges
from Years of State Terror”)



In 1989, the GAM resumed its armed struggle. GAM rebels carried
out a series of attacks on soldiers and non-Achenese migrants in
the region. The Suharto government responded to the GAM by mobilizing
the military (TNI), carrying out counterinsurgency operations against
suspected members of the GAM code-named Red Net in early 1990. Special
elite forces of the TNI were sent to the province to hunt down GAM
members. Moreover, the TNI designated Aceh as a special area of
military operations (DOM). DOM means that it gives the TNI “an informal
authority to take whatever measures are necessary to maintain security
in the province.” (ICG, Asia Report No.17, 3, footnote 13) As a
result, by 1997, clashes between the two waned, and GAM members
began underground movements. (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
January 2001)



The next phase of the conflict began in 1998 when, as a consequence
of the demise of the Suharto regime, frustrations were unleashed
across the archipelago. The fact that Suharto’s successor Habibie
allowed a referendum for East Timor, and that he initially promised
to redress past mistakes as well as the establishment of commission
for human rights violations, raised expectations among Acehnese
with the awakening of political liberalization. Even General Waranto,
then minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the TNI, was
forced to apologize the past abuses, withdrawing the DOM status
from Aceh. However, thousands of TNI troops went into Aceh when
student activists group SIRA (Central Information for Referendum
Aceh) initiated a rally for a referendum on Aceh’s future on November
8, 1999. Aspirations for a referendum have rapidly gained support
from Acehnese throughout the province, and the GAM has intensified
its guerrilla activities. The prosecution against military personnel
has virtually halted and the TNI’s counterinsurgency operations
have resulted in significant deaths of Acehnese civilians, thousands
of internally displaced people, and hundreds of Acehnese fleeing
to Malaysia. Acehnese resentment towards the Indonesian central
government and the TNI has significantly grown. Human Rights Watch
reports:



Since Suharto’s fall, … a broad based coalitions of students,
clerics, intellectuals, civil servants and entrepreneurs, though
opposed to the violent methods of the rebels, have become outraged
at the government’s failure to put an end to the military’s dismal
record of abuses in the province and now share the insurgents’ anti-Jakarta
sentiment…Greater political, social, and economic autonomy are
objectives now widely shared among Acehnese. (Human Rights Watch,
May, 2000)



Key Players



GAM (Free Aceh Movement)



The GAM insists that Aceh was illegally transferred to Indonesia
in 1949 when Indonesia became independent. In 1976, the GAM (the
Free Aceh Movement) was formed under Hasan di Tiro, who has been
in exile in Sweden since 1980, proclaimed independence and initiated
an armed struggle. The GAM was then backed mainly by some of the
local population and supporters in Malaysia. (Sidel, sect. 2) However,
since the GAM lacked major support from Acehnese, its movement at
that time was limited to small-scale guerrilla activities for several
years, accordingly being suppressed by the Suharto’s authoritarian
government. After the defeats by the Indonesian government, some
of the radical members fled to Sweden and Malaysia. Initial GAM
activities had therefore failed to become influential among many
Acehnese.



Recently GAM’s guerrilla activities have intensified with massive
support from local Acehnese in terms of information, weapons and
money. The TNI is experiencing difficulties in suppressing GAM movements.
The GAM is currently assumed to have control over 80 percent of
villages in Aceh (ICG, Asia Report No.17, 5), where marriage licenses,
property transactions, and tax collection are under its control.
(Washington Post, 18 April, 2001)



The GAM originally rejected the concept of special autonomy within
the framework of Indonesia, claiming that its goal was independence
to the end. Recently, the GAM seems to resist whatever measures
the central government takes.



However, the GAM is not a unified organization. GAM members have
different motives. For example, some members loyal to their leader
are participating in the movement with pursuing independence; some
are out for revenge for murders of their families committed by the
TNI; others are doing so simply because of the desire to commit
banditry at the conflict sites. (ICG, Asia Report No.18, 18) The
GAM is also alleged to be divided about what system the independent
Aceh should take, such as democracy, sultanate. (Inside Indonesia,
No. 62)



The GAM is sometimes described as a Muslim extremist group, it appears
to have the aspects of a guerrilla group seeking Aceh independence.
The GAM is especially active in Pidie, Bireuen, and North and East
Aceh, where major oil reserves are concentrated. Especially, Lhokseumawe,
where Indonesia’s leading oil and gas producer Exxon-Mobil is located,
is one of the famous oil sites under GAM’s control in Indonesia.




The Indonesian government and the TNI



Both the government and the TNI have no intention to allow independence
for Aceh. Here lies the biggest disparity between the two forces
and difficulties of the resolution to this conflict.



The Wahid government adopted several approaches other than military
crackdown in order to deal with Aceh problem. As for the TNI, however,
a call for a referendum has even been rejected on the ground that
it would cause similar conflicts in other restive regions of Indonesia,
finally causing the disintegration of the entire archipelago. “Anything
that threatens or is believed to threaten the borders, from within
or without, is conceived as a threat to the state that TNI is sworn
to defend. The problem in Aceh can be likened to a family where
the father is responsible for the behavior of his children.” (ICG,
Asia Report No.17, 19)



The traditional strategies of the TNI have been sending overwhelming
number of its troops to rebellions. (ICG, Asia Report No.17, 12)
As the GAM intensifies its guerrilla activities, the TNI has responded
to GAM with more troops. The death toll in the past three years
is said to be about the same as during the decade under Suharto.
(Far Eastern Economic Review, 05 July, 2001) In 2001 alone, more
than 900 people, 75 percent of whom are civilians, are estimated
to have been killed. (UNOCHA, 6 July, 2001) According to BBC, the
death toll this year is already about 1000. (BBC, 7 July, 2001)




Moreover, the TNI has carried out some intelligence operations so
that its missions and authority could be justified. Among them are
secret operations in industrial areas like Lhokseumawe with intent
to blame disruption of production and human rights abuses for the
GAM, and ‘civic action programs’ in GAM controlled areas in order
to discourage local population from supporting the GAM. (ICG, Asia
Report No.17, 17)



Nature of the abuses



TNI atrocities



The independent commission on violence in Aceh, created in 1998
by former president Habibie, assessed that over 90 percent of human
rights abuses in the area were committed by the TNI and the police
during the period 1989-98. (ICG, Asia Report No.17, 8) Recent data,
covering August 1998 to 1999, the Care for Human Rights Forum (FPHAM),
reveals that 534 were killed, 83.7 percent of which, 447, were civilians,
and 15.7 percent of which, 84, were military and police members.
(Jakarta Post, 11 January, 2000)



TNI’s target has been, and still is, GAM members and its supporters.
However, the TNI seems to have targeted civilians as well, who may
be seen as GAM sympathizers. Among other atrocities, a particularly
gruesome instance gained wide press attention when a local man,
not a GAM member, had his kidney taken out for a military officer
after 20 days of detention with almost no food. (BBC, 30 January,
2001) Moreover, humanitarian workers have often become victims of
the violence committed by the TNI and the police. ICG warns that
such aid workers are targeted regardless of their objectives, because
the TNI deems them as helping the GAM. (ICG, Asia Report No.17,
15-16) In fact, many NGOs working in Aceh are viewed ‘not to be
neutral’. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 05 July, 2001) Even journalists
are often threatened or tortured. According to the Jakarta Post,
53 cases of crimes against the media were reported between 1999
and June 2001. (Jakarta Post, 09 July, 2001)



Special security forces, which had virtually been identical to the
TNI under the Suharto era, were separated from the TNI in 1999.
Yet, the police are stationed at local districts, and their units
called Brimob have still carried out military-like
operations or actual joint operations with the TNI. Therefore, the
police and the TNI can be said to remain virtually the same. The
units Brimob are alleged to be less disciplined and to commit various
abuses including murder as well.



The following are examples of likely crimes against humanity,
massacres and discovered mass gravesites indicating the potential
danger for future genocidal activities.