FORWARD
Michael
Kopetski________________________________________________________
Michael J. Kopetski
served as Congressman in the One Hundred Second and One Hundred Third
Congresses as a Representative from
1991 to January 3, 1995. He is best known as the co-author of the 1992 nuclear
test moratorium legislation that led to the halting of further testing. He served as an aide to Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 1973-1974. He also worked as the committee administrator
on the
1977-1979. He was also the co-author of,
“What
did we tell you? India’s
tests of nuclear bombs prove the need for test ban treaty,” Oregonian, May
13, 1998.
Genocide
is an ugly word. Used sparingly in
writings, the subject matter for an allegation of such is often critiqued first
to justify the connection to the very usage of the word.
It should be so. It is more than murder. It
is a conscious act usually born of hatred, history or ignorance.
When done by a State this monstrous deed seemingly provides justification for the offenders
as if a government’s imprimatur trumps definition. The
idea that because a State engages in genocide cloaked in a mantra of national
security does not explain or justify genocidal acts.
I
applaud the Center for the Prevention of Genocide for its leadership in
bringing to the world’s attention this timely examination of the multiple
outcomes and consequences of a nuclear exchange between
and
situation between these two great nation states continues to be the most
understated flash point in the world today. It
far exceeds the potential human and environmental devastation of any terrorist
act. Its consequences are far
beyond its own ground zero, posing a threat to people throughout the world.
The
readers will learn of the closeness of a nuclear war between these two dynamic
States. For those of us old enough
to remember the threat of nuclear war during the Cold War, we will be reminded
of the tragic consequences for the entire world with the detonation of one
nuclear bomb. For those too young,
you will learn why nuclear bombs are of a different kind of military weapon
such that mankind’s greatest challenge is to eliminate them.
In
this new century a discussion of a nexus between genocide and a nuclear
exchange is in order. The end of
the Cold War, the ability of terrorists to launch an effective attack within
the borders of the
States
proven in war this past decade gives rise to this discussion.
The
Geneva Convention defines “genocide” as “…any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group…” Nation states are included. Unfortunately
to date, use of a nuclear weapon against another nation is exempt from the
definition of “genocide”.
In
spite of the recent domination of media and rhetorical focus on terrorists
utilizing a nuclear bomb, the risk of a nuclear detonation by a nation state
far exceeds the risk by a terrorist organization. This
nuclear risk is nowhere greater than between
and
deserves at least the attention and work as is being done to prevent terrorists
from obtaining necessary nuclear bomb-making ingredients. This
latter point needs highlighting. The
variety, accuracy and kill-load of conventional weapons have reached their
adulthood. This war-experienced
adulthood calls into question the very need militarily, if there was one, for a
nuclear arsenal. Deterrence remains the lone reason, since adversaries know
that annihilation will be mutual.
Those
nuclear weapon states that are signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) are trapped in this world of mutually assured destruction.
Their path out of the trap is found in the legal commitment to work to that day of freedom
from the responsibility of possessing nuclear bombs. Should
membership in the NPT also excuse the use of nuclear bombs from charges of
genocide?
This discussion should be explored.
Whether
one is a terrorist or a nuclear weapon state, there is but one rationale for
possessing a nuclear bomb and that reason is militaristic.
Possession means convincing your target that you will use it. Beyond
this military fact no reason exists. For
a signatory of the NPT, a nuclear weapons state can maintain both the position
of using it militarily and, at the same time, work towards the goal of ridding
itself of possession without casting doubt to the target. For
non-nuclear weapons states as are
and
without credibility.
Should
membership in the NPT excuse the nuclear weapon state user of a nuclear bomb
from charges of genocide? Current international law says yes, it does. Has
the end of the Cold War, the availability of fissile material on the world
market, the maturation of conventional weapons and the potential switching of
non-nuclear weapon states to nuclear changed the legal rationale for exemption?
This discussion should be explored but not here. Should
current non-signatories be treated different under international law?
The
nuclear bomb is older by a few years than either
or
nations, however, are ancient cultures whose imprints continue to enrich the
lives of today’s world in art, literature, philosophy, the sciences, religion,
and political thought. Each state
is blessed today with extremely intelligent people. As
sovereign states each is responsible for its political and military decisions. To
eliminate forever the threat of a nuclear exchange or a war with conventional
weapons will take the political will by the people and leaders of both
countries.
However, it should be clear to both nations that the existing threat of either or both
nations using nuclear bombs by their nature is a threat to all humans, all
nation states, and therefore has an impact far beyond their own political
differences. The rest of the world
has a responsibility to become directly involved. The
Center is serving an important catalytic role with this publication.
INTRODUCTION
In January of last year, it was
public knowledge that
and
were close to exploding into war; what is not generally known is how close the
two antagonists were to a nuclear confrontation. Escalating
rhetoric on both sides inflamed an already tenuous situation in the immediate
aftermath of an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The
situation intensified to the point that the entire international community
feared the smallest spark could lead to a full-scale conflagration. The
rhetoric has cooled some in the past year, but the two rivals continue to
exchange icy political barbs.
and
have fought three wars since gaining independence from
Britain
in 1947. Yet, a fourth war could
have more devastating human consequences than the other three combined. Both
countries declared
themselves
nuclear powers in 1998 and have openly expressed their willingness to eschew
conventional warfare in favor of the nuclear option.
Just what would the consequences be
should Indian and
engage in a nuclear showdown? How
catastrophic would the losses be in human terms? How
many people would be immediately exterminated in the blast and ensuing nuclear
fallout?
How many people would be displaced from their homes? Would
the international community be able to respond quickly and to help minimize the
casualties?
The Center for the Prevention of
Genocide has compiled a report showing that the possibility of nuclear war
between
and
is both more dangerous and more probable than during the majority of the Cold
War between the
and the
tremendous civilian casualties that would result from such a nuclear war. This
report highlights how a lack of established military protocol or a direct
hotline increases the prospect of accidental catastrophe or nuclear warfare
through miscommunication. With a response time within three minutes as opposed
to twenty-five minutes (during the Cold War), the likelihood for
miscommunication is drastically increased between
and
due to the absence of established checks and balances, monitoring, and
protocol. Our hope is that this publication will help to elevate the awareness
of the threat-both in the eyes of the general public and global policymakers-to
help mitigate the possibility of its occurrence.
***
The four articles in this report
highlight two parts of the
and
nuclear danger, the first is the likelihood of such an exchange due to
antagonism, lack of controls and brief response times. These
all increase the possibility of misunderstandings and miscommunications that
can lead to an exchange. The second
part of the report details the potential toll in civilian lives and the
challenges these countries face in order to move themselves away from the
nuclear confrontation abyss.
The
article by
Gaurav
Kampani
addresses the antagonism which heightens the danger of nuclear confrontation in
Kampani
explains, the conflict between
and
represents a clear threat of nuclear war. Given the volatile hostility between
the two states, it is imperative to consider the present risk and civilian
casualty toll that would result from a nuclear confrontation in
Asia
In the second article,
Jaya
Tiwari
describes the horrific medical, social, and environmental ramifications of a
nuclear conflict. As
Jaya
Tiwari
explains, the human consequences of a nuclear war in
would be catastrophic. She cites
real life examples of nuclear fall-out devastation and several scenarios of
conflict levels. It is a chilling and thorough account of the dangers that lie
ahead for their populations if the issue is not thoroughly addressed.
Inter-state communication is
critical when examining the tensions between
and
increased given reckless declarations by each side and poor direct
communication between these regional powers. With
little direct communication, Indian and
signal their intentions to one another via indirect and implicit mediums. This
mechanism of communication is of great concern to the international community.
Peter
Lavoy
discusses this and the issue
of “credibility”
regarding a relatively small military use of nuclear capabilities in the third
article.
Michael
Krepon
highlights the pitfalls and the diplomatic and communication mechanisms which
can be put in place in place to avoid an unwanted or accidental escalation of
military conflict. He addresses
risk reduction measures, confidence building measures and other issues as he
discusses the difficult obstacles the lie ahead for
and
INDIA-PAKISTAN: AN OVERVIEW
Gaurav
Kampani_____________________________________________________
Gaurav
Kampani
is the Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Before joining the Center, he was a Herbert Scoville
Peace Fellow at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington
D.C.
to nuclear proliferation in South Asia .
Kampani
has an M.A. degree in International politics from American
University in Washinton D.C., and an M.A. in
Political Science from Delhi University, new Delhi, India
co-author of “
Pakistan: Shift Away from Indo-Centricism?,” Dawn, 2001. He also wrote an issue brief entitled,
“Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why It Isn’t Over Yet”
in June of 2002.
is often described as the likeliest place for a possible nuclear war in the
future. International concerns about such a possibility are tied to
and
the early-1990s and their unending conflict over the disputed state of
lies at the heart of the ideological rivalry between
Delhi
and
claims
on legal grounds; retention of control over the province is also seen as vital
to reaffirming
claims
on grounds that
and
were partitioned in 1947 on the principal of geographically contiguous
territories where Hindu and Muslim populations were in a majority. Under the
above criteria,
belongs to
The ideological rivalry between
Delhi
and
has resulted in two major wars over
in 1948 and 1965. After
acquired nuclear capabilities in the late-1980s, it decided to exploit the
disaffection of
or ‘sub-conventional’ war against
would be deterred from escalating the guerilla war into a large-scale
conventional war due to fears that such a war might turn nuclear. Although
has succeeded in deterring
from launching a larger conventional war, yet the decade-old sub-conventional
war in
has led to recurring crises and brought both countries to the brink of war.
Nuclear competition in
Asia
is in some ways similar and in others different from the Cold War rivalry
between the
and the
ballast and reinforced the post-World War II status quo between the superpowers
in
and the
after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 also led Washington Moscow to initiate
confidence building and other risk reduction measures. By the late 1960s, the
nuclear arms competition stabilized through secure second strike capabilities,
robust early warning and redundant command and control systems, multiple
channels of communications, and arms control treaties.
However, in contrast,
nuclearization of
has produced several unsettling trends. Instead of reinforcing the status quo
in the region, it has led to a regime of chronic instability. Because of
tensions, Indian and Pakistani relations are now at their nadir, with the
result that government-to-government communication is weak and other
alternative channels of communication, vital to avoid a catastrophe or defuse
misunderstandings, are in disuse.
hostage to the
dispute has also prevented both countries from institutionalizing and
operationalizing confidence building measures. Observers fear that
and
could stumble into a nuclear exchange as the result of either complex
organizational failure or accident.
Although Indian and Pakistani
leaders routinely claim that the dangers of a nuclear war in
Asia
are exaggerated, the risk of such an eventuality has accentuated over the
years. During the 1990s,
and
that could largely be described as symbolic. To be sure, both countries had the
capability to deliver nuclear weapons during an emergency, yet that capability
was limited to a few unassembled warheads and aircraft-based delivery systems.
At the time, neither country had
weaponized
more sophisticated nuclear weapon designs; their capacity to deliver nuclear
weapons using ballistic missiles was also unclear. Furthermore, weapon systems
were not integrated into the militaries and neither country had thought through
doctrines of actual nuclear use.
However, in the post-1998 period,
and
have developed relatively sophisticated nuclear weapon designs. More ominously,
both countries are now fully committed to developing operational nuclear
forces. Recurring crises in the region over
since the late 1980s have also led militaries in both countries to actively
plan the operational use of such weapons in war. As the weaker conventional
power,
has adopted a nuclear “first-use” doctrine. Apparently, the Pakistani military
plans to use nuclear weapons early in any war with
to impose early war termination on the Indian leadership and invite
international intervention. Likewise,
the Indian government, frustrated with the mounting cost of the
Pakistan-supported insurgency in
conventional war against
geographic scope and intensity, and one that does not threaten
Such thinking brought
and
to the brink of war during the compound crisis that lasted from December 2001
until October 2002.
In 2002, a classified Pentagon
study, the results of which were shared with the Indian and Pakistani
governments, estimated that a nuclear war between
and
could result in 12 million deaths. Another study produced by the Natural
Resources Defense Council estimates that a limited exchange of nuclear weapons,
10 nuclear warheads of
size exploded in the air, would lead to immediate casualty figures of
approximately 1.5 million dead and nearly 3.5 million wounded. In a different
scenario in
Figure 1A
which
24 nuclear weapons were exploded at ground level on 12 major urban targets in
and
with health threats to another 30 million people as a result of the nuclear
fallout. By this estimate, 99 percent of the Indo-Pakistani populations would
remain unaffected by the results of the nuclear exchange. Similarly, the armed
forces of both countries would in theory remain intact and continue escalating
hostilities against one another.
Figure 1B
Although Indian and Pakistani
elites routinely dismiss Western concerns, yet their ideological antagonisms,
political obstinacy, differing perceptions of crises outcomes, amidst
continuing nuclear competition, have indeed made
the most likely venue for a nuclear exchange in the near future.
NUCLEAR WAR IN
SOUTH ASIA
MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
Jaya
Tiwari
_____________________________________________________________
Research Director of the Security program at
Physicians for Social Responsibility.
Ms. Tiwari has been
involved in research, analysis, and writing about nuclear weapons proliferation,
WMD terrorism, nuclear disarmament, compensation for U.S. nuclear weapons
workers, health and environmental effects of nuclear waste, and the Yucca mountain nuclear waste repository issues. Before joining PSR, Jaya
worked at the Center for Defense information and Bellona
environmental consequences of
pursuing a Ph.D. in International Studies from the Old Dominion University
(ODU), Norfolk, VA. She holds an MA
degree in International Studies from old
University
from
Hindu
University
,
India
Introduction
and
have shared an adversarial relationship since their independence from
Britain
in 1947. The memories of the bloody religious and ethnic conflict during the
time of the partition of colonial
into two independent states,
and
in both countries. In the years after independence, lingering territorial
disputes between the two countries, mainly over the control of the
Kashmir
area, have resulted in two major wars in 1947 and 1965. The two countries also
fought another war in 1971, when the Indian military intervened in
independent state,
The
Threat of Nuclear War in
South Asia
Prior to India and Pakistan testing
their nuclear weapons in 1998, supporters of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
weapon programs had argued that possession of nuclear weapons by the two
countries would serve as a deterrent and mark the end of military conflict
between them since both parties would have a lot to lose if nuclear weapons
were used. Such assertions have not
proven true.[ii]
On the contrary, the Indian sub-continent is now considered
“the most likely place in the world for a nuclear war.”[iii]
Just a year after
and
openly tested their nuclear weapons and declared themselves nuclear powers in
May 1998, the two countries’ armed forces found themselves locked in a fierce
battle along the Line of Control (LOC) in the area of
Kargil.
Experts believe that
and
came
much closer to nuclear war during the
Kargil
conflict than was commonly known at the time. According to Bruce O. Riedel, a
senior advisor to President Clinton on South Asian affairs during the
Kargil
War, the Pakistani military had started preparing its nuclear arsenals for
possible deployment without informing then Prime Minister
Nawaz
Sharif. Bruce Riedel believes that
Nawaz
Sharif
was largely unaware of this key development and was “taken aback” when
confronted by President Clinton and his senior advisors with intelligence
showing the Pakistani military preparing its intermediate-range missiles with
nuclear warheads.[iv]
Bruce Riedel’s account of this event was also confirmed by
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott, who led
talks with
and
following the 1998 nuclear tests by the two countries, and other senior
officials. Strobe
Talbott
later acknowledged that the
Kargil
dispute “had the potential of going all the way.”[v]
Most recently, in summer 2002,
and
narrowly avoided another military confrontation. The 2002 crisis came in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack in
on the Indian parliament building on
13, 2001
Jaish-e-Mohammad and the
Lashkar-e-Taiba, for this attack. The government
also blamed these groups for running a separatist campaign in
and demanded the Pakistani government cease all support for these groups
and shut
down militant training camps based in Pakistan-occupied
Over a million Indian and Pakistani soldiers stood eyeball to
eyeball for six months amid the daily exchange of artillery fire following the
December terrorist attack. The massive military buildup along the LOC was
accompanied by increasingly inflammatory war rhetoric from political and
military leaders on both sides. While Indian Prime Minister
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee asked the Indian military to prepare for “a decisive battle,”
[vii]
Pakistani President
Pervez
Musharraf
warned that his country would use its “full might” (i.e. nuclear weapons) if
attacked by India.[viii]
In another example of nuclear saber-rattling, Indian Defense
Minister George
Fernandes
declared that
“could take a strike, survive and then hit back, and
would be finished.”[ix]
The possibility of the 2002
standoff between
and
reaching a nuclear level was considered extremely serious. For weeks, high
level international diplomatic efforts were focused on pulling
and
away from the brink of war. A constant parade of world leaders, including U.S.
Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage, Russian President Vladimir
Putin
and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, in
and
during this crisis was evidence of growing international concern that another
war between the two nuclear armed neighbors could very well get out of control.
Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and the 2002 crisis ended without a major
war. However, the long history of tense India-Pakistan relations and the
continuing territorial dispute over
could easily create a situation where the two countries find themselves back in
the same situation.
Living With the Nuclear Bomb:
The Next India-Pakistan War May NOT be Just
Another
War
and
have been at odds since their independence and, as mentioned above, have fought
more than once in the past. If the two countries have managed to survive the
effects of past war, why should the international community, or even the people
in
and
be
so concerned about another war between two old rivals?
The
difference is the presence of nuclear weapons. While the exact details of the
size and nature of Indian and Pakistani nuclear stockpiles remain classified, there are varying estimates.
Jane’s defense experts believe the Indian stockpile could have up to 250
warheads and
A more conservative estimate is provided by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute’s Project on Nuclear Technology and Arms Control that puts the
Pakistani stockpile between thirty to fifty
and the Indian arsenal between thirty to forty nuclear weapons.
[xi]
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates put
and
as having fifty to seventy five weapons, with
having slightly fewer warheads than
Most conservative estimates put the Indian and Pakistani
stockpiles to be under fifty
As
and
continue to develop and deploy nuclear weapons, the likelihood of these weapons
being used, whether accidentally or intentionally, increases as well. Proponents
of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon programs often point to the Cold War
rivalry between the
States
and the former
Union
to make a case that nuclear armed
and
can manage their adversarial relationship and avoid a nuclear confrontation,
just as the two Superpowers did. This line of argument overlooks the fact that
despite their enormously expansive and elaborate early-warning and command and
control systems designed to prevent any accident or mishap, the United States
and the Soviet Union came very close to nuclear war on many occasions.[xiii]
The geographic distance between the two superpowers gave them
up to twenty-five minutes of warning time to assess the validity of the threats
and make response decisions. In the case of
and
will have three to five minutes of warning and response time.
[xiv]
Even if
and
had no budgetary or technical constraints to building and maintaining
U.S.-Soviet style early-warning and command and control systems, the extremely
short window of time for decision making would likely render such systems
useless in the event of a real attack.[xv]
Also, the superpowers’ ideological rivalry during the Cold War
rarely carried the kind of deeply rooted religious and territorial hostility
that has marked relations between
and
its nuclear missiles during the
Kargil
War and the heated rhetoric during the 2002 standoff illustrate that the
military and political leadership in the two countries views nuclear weapons as
a part of available options that they stand ready to use.
Despite
the hawkish rhetoric and missile and bomb touting between
and
public and policy-makers alike, of the true extent of devastation that would
result in the aftermath of a nuclear war.[xvi]
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
In the early morning hours of
the
States
conducted the world’s first nuclear explosion, code named
Trinity, at the
in
Mexico
Watching the enormous fireball engulf the desert sky, the father of the
nuclear weapon program, Robert Oppenheimer, uttered the following phrase from
the Hindu scripture Bhagavad-Gita:
“If the radiance of a thousand suns
Were to burst at once into the sky,
That would be like the splendor of the Mighty One…
I am become Death,
The
shatterer
of Worlds.”
In many ways, Oppenheimer’s awed description
of Trinity sums up the immense
destructive power inherent to nuclear weapons that sets these weapons apart
from any other weapon.
Providing an accurate description
of how a nuclear explosion would affect an Indian or Pakistani city is
difficult because much of our understanding of the effects of nuclear war is
based largely on theoretical knowledge. In real life, there are only two
examples of the use of nuclear weapons. In August 1945, the
States
dropped two nuclear bombs, completely destroying Japanese cities
and
was over 100,000 and 70,000 in
Thousands more suffered and died in the months after the
attacks. At the end of that year
and
had lost some 140,000 and 270,000 residents respectively.[xviii]
While the 1940s Japanese cities
and
were very different from a large city in today’s
or
cities provides a rough idea of the consequences of such an explosion for a
large South Asian city. The death toll in
is likely to far exceed the
and
numbers given that the populations in large Indian or Pakistani cities are an
order of magnitude higher than that of the two Japanese cities. For example, at
the time of the attack on
approximately 350,000 while several Indian and Pakistani cities have
populations of several millions.[xix]
In some ways a nuclear explosion is
similar to a conventional high explosive detonation in that it results in the
very rapid release of a large amount of energy within a limited space.[xx]
This sudden release of energy leads to a considerable increase
of temperature and pressure converting all the materials present into hot,
compressed gases. Because of their extremely high temperatures and pressures,
these gases expand rapidly, initiating a pressure wave called a “shock wave” in
the surrounding medium-air, water, or earth. A shock wave in air is generally
referred to as a “blast wave” because it resembles and is accompanied by a very
strong wind. In water or in the ground, however, the term “shock” is used,
because the effect is like that of a sudden impact.[xxi]
While the general principle being somewhat
similar for all explosions, Samuel
Glasstone
and Philip J. Dolan list the following characteristics that distinguish a
nuclear explosion from other
high-explosive weapons:[xxii]
1. A nuclear explosion can be many thousands (or millions) of times more
powerful than the largest conventional detonation.
2. For the release of a given amount of energy, the mass of a nuclear
explosive would be much less than
that of a conventional high explosive. Consequently, in the former case, there
is a much smaller amount of material available in the weapon itself that is
converted into the hot, compressed gases mentionedabove. This results in somewhat different mechanisms for the
initiation of the blast wave.
3.
The temperatures reached in a nuclear
explosion are much higher than in a conventional explosion, and a fairly large
proportion of the energy in a nuclear explosion is emitted in the form of light
and heat, generally referred to as “thermal radiation.” This is capable of
causing skin burns and of starting fires at considerable distances.
4. The nuclear explosion is accompanied by highly-penetrating and harmful
invisible rays, called the “initial nuclear radiation.”
5. Finally, the substances remaining after a nuclear explosion are
radioactive, emitting similar radiation over an extended period of time. This
is known as “residual nuclear radiation” or “residual radioactivity.”
A nuclear explosion is a complex
phenomenon combining multiple chain reactions of activities taking place at the
same time. The precise effects of a nuclear explosion will depend on the type
of burst (i.e. air, high-altitude, surface, or subsurface), the design of the
weapon, and prevailing meteorological conditions, such as temperature,
humidity, wind, precipitation, and atmospheric pressure, and even the nature of
the terrain over which the explosion occurs.[xxiii]
There are specific characteristics
associated with short and long term health and environmental effects of a
nuclear explosion. The short-term effects of a nuclear explosion occur within
the first few weeks while the long-term health and environmental effects
associated with a nuclear explosion could take years or decades to manifest.
The radiation from fallout could lead to long-term cancer and other risks in
the affected population.
In the event of a nuclear explosion
in an urban area, as experienced by Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the first
effect comes in the form of an extremely intense flash of heat and light,
something akin to Oppenheimer’s ‘radiance of a thousand suns’ description of
the Trinity test. This flash of heat
and light could be so powerful that people making a reflex glance, even from
tens of miles away, could suffer retinal burning and potential blindness.[xxiv]
Within milliseconds of the explosion, fireballs would start
forming in every direction from ground zero enveloping a large area. The
initial blast or shock wave also produces overpressures of many pounds per
square inch. This kind of effect could result in the walls of buildings and
homes being blown away and turning bricks, lumber, furniture, cars and even
people into missiles.
In addition to the physical effects
of blast, overpressures, and fire, people in the epicenter of the blast and the
immediate surrounding areas would also simultaneously experience exposure to
neutron and gamma radiation, resulting from the nuclear reactions responsible
for the explosion.[xxv]
As it was observed at
and
variety of symptoms such as severe nausea, bloody diarrhea, and hemorrhages.
Acute radiation effects generally occur within one to two hours, but the
long-term effects of exposure to radiation could appear years later in the form
of leukemia, thyroid cancer, breast cancer, and lung cancer, as well as many
forms of birth defects and mental retardation in young children.[xxvi]
Within minutes of a nuclear
explosion, the individual fires ignited by the initial flash of light and heat
start coalescing into a massive firestorm. The firestorm resulting from a
size bomb over an Indian city like
could engulf areas larger than a mile with temperatures in the fire zone
reaching several hundred degrees Fahrenheit. In a large, modern city like
petroleum storage and distribution facilities would serve as further fuel and
spread the firestorm. The corresponding storage and dispensing facilities for
such highly flammable and explosive fuels would increase the numbers of
casualties. Cities like
and
are also home to large chemical plants and industries. A nuclear explosion and
associated firestorm would likely unleash tons of highly toxic materials and
chemicals into the environment.[xxvii]
The large fire zone would also act
as a huge pump, sucking in air from the surrounding areas and driving heated
air upwards. This pumping action would create hurricane-force winds destroying
the remaining structures and buildings in the area.[xxviii]
The combined effects of superheated wind, toxic smoke, and
combustion gases would result in a death rate approaching one hundred percent
in the fire zone. The firestorm would burn for days and produce massive amounts
of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxidecausing
asphyxiation, even among those in heavily protected shelters.
The explosion of a nuclear bomb at
a low altitude vaporizes and lifts up a large amount of materials and debris
into the mushroom cloud. As this
mixes with the fireball’s radioactive materials, a cloud of highly radioactive
dust is created that, depending on the prevailing meteorological conditions,
could travel large distances before ultimately falling back to earth. The
closer the bomb is detonated to the ground, the larger and more lethal the
radioactive fallout.In
cities that are close to rivers or oceans, the resulting water vapor in the
atmosphere condenses around radioactive particles and descends as rain. Many of
the
and
survivors described this phenomenon as the “black rain with big drops.” The
areas affected by high levels of fallout would experience high levels of
casualties, radiation sickness, and long-term risks of cancer and other
radiation related diseases.[xxix]
Medical aid to victims in the area
of a nuclear explosion is difficult to deliver. In the case of a big city like
to be destroyed in the first stages of blast and fire. In
out of 45 hospital facilities were destroyed by the nuclear attack. Many of the
medical facilities that manage to survive the destruction may be rendered
useless if they are in the high fallout zone. Hospitals and health care
facilities in large Indian and Pakistani cities are overcrowded and struggling
to meet the public’s needs on a normal day.
The ability of such facilities
to treat and care for hundreds of thousands of severely burned, injured and
radiation-exposed victims at once, as would be the case in the aftermath of a
nuclear war, is highly questionable.
Getting outside medical help to the affected areas would be impossible in the
short-term and extremely challenging in the long-term, since much of the
transportation and communication networks would have been destroyed.
Various
Scenarios of Nuclear Strike between
India
and
Pakistan
and Estimated Casualties and Health Effects
A number of government, academic,
and think tank studies conducted in the
have attempted to assess the impact of nuclear war between
and
Pakistan, a Pentagon study attempted to assess
consequences of ‘limited’ and
‘full-scale’ nuclear war scenarios between India and Pakistan. This study,
based on assumptions that
has “a couple of dozen” nuclear warheads and
has “several dozen,” concluded that even a “more limited” nuclear war between
and
would have cataclysmic results.[xxx]
A full-scale nuclear war, according to Pentagon estimates,
could result in over twelve million immediate deaths and injure another seven
million. The aftermath of such event, as the Defense Department estimated,
would result in a humanitarian crisis of such a magnitude “that every medical
facility in the
East
and
would be quickly overwhelmed.”[xxxi]
Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld
and the Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage
shared this analysis and the resulting data with Indian and Pakistani leaders
in an attempt to cool-off the war rhetoric in the region.
A number of other studies have also
examined different nuclear exchange scenarios between
and
with varying casualties and fallout estimates. In one of the first such
studies, published in 1999 by the International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War (IPPNW), physicist M.V.
Ramana
described the effects of a 15 kiloton nuclear weapon explosion over
The study predicted that a single
size nuclear device, if exploded at an elevation of 600 meters above
weeks.[xxxiii]
This study provides a very conservative estimate since it uses
an airburst explosion scenario, which only takes into account the immediate
blast and fire effects and factors in negligible fallout.
In the long-term, fallout could result in many thousands of additional deaths and
adverse health effects.[xxxiv]
Using similar assumptions as for
the nuclear explosion over
Ramana, along with Matthew
McKinzie,
Zia
Mian, and A.H.
Nayyar, further estimated the consequences of a
large-scale nuclear war in
characteristics and consequences of the Hiroshima bombing with its massive
fires, radiation sicknesses, severe burns, deaths in buildings collapsed by the
shock wave, hurricane-force winds propelling missiles through the air, and
blindness, the authors estimated the numbers of deaths and injuries from
nuclear attacks on ten major Indian and Pakistani cities. The authors predicted
that, even in the most conservative estimates, a total of 2.9 million immediate
deaths and an additional 1.5 million severe injuries would result in these
cities.[xxxv]
In another study, the Heritage
Foundation analysts the
used the Department of Defense’s Consequences Assessment Tool Set (CATS)
software to analyze three different nuclear exchange scenarios between
and
and the likely casualties from the each case.[xxxvi]
The first scenario analyzed by the
Heritage Foundation involved conventional ground forces from India invading
possible terrorist training camps in Pakistan. The scenario starts with Indian
military invading the Pakistani border city of
Muzaffarabad
to dismantle the terrorist training camps which the Indian intelligence
services have long suspected for providing aid to Kashmiri militants. The
scenario assumes that, in an effort to fight off the attacking Indian troops in
Muzaffarabad
explodes a small 10 kiloton nuclear bomb. The model showed more than 3,400
civilian deaths in
and approximately 5,000 Indian military deaths with the radiation fallout
affecting another 29,000 residents of
easterly winds in the area, much of the fallout would continue into
and affect tens of thousands of additional people.[xxxvii]
The
second scenario in this study showed
and
escalating their conflict to a nuclear exchange against two border cities.
second largest
city,
would result in about 122,000 immediate deaths across the 1.75 mile initial
blast zone, with an additional 150,000 to 300,000 people exposed to high levels
of lethal radiation outside of that zone. A Pakistani retaliatory strike using
a 10 kiloton bomb against
Amritsar
would result in about 112,000 deaths and over 200,000 people would be affected
by lethal fallout.[xxxviii]
In the
final scenario, the authors examined a nuclear exchange against each of the
capital cities. The Indian attack on
with a 12 kiloton fission bomb would immediately kill 115,000 civilians, with
another 195,000 deaths attributed to the fallout. A similar strike using a 12
kiloton fission bomb on the Indian capital
would have an immediate death toll of 125,000 and an estimated 365,000 civilian
deaths resulting from the fallout.[xxxix]
The number of casualties, even in
the short-term, would dramatically increase if
or
were faced with a ground-burst rather than an air-burst scenario as described
in the above studies. Scientists at the Natural Resources Defense Council used
the CATS software to analyze a scenario where
and
both use a dozen 25 kiloton warheads to strike fifteen major cities in the two
countries.[xl]
All nuclear weapons in this scenario are detonated on the
ground producing substantial fallout. NRDC calculations predicted that some
22.1 million people in
and
would be exposed to lethal radiation doses in the first two days after such an
attack. Another 8 million people would receive radiation doses
of 100 to 600 rem,
causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death. NRDC also estimated
that the fallout from such an attack would threaten some 30 million people in
and
The global impacts of nuclear war
in
are difficult to predict. For example, no major study has looked at the
potential health effects to regional and global populations from radiation
fallout from a South Asian nuclear exchange. Some experts believe that even a
large nuclear exchange, involving many weapons, between
and
would probably not pose any immediate health danger beyond the region. However,
the long-term global and regional consequences of related radiation fallout are
less certain. Studies examining the impact of the 1986 accident at the
nuclear power plant have found that the radioactive fallout from this accident
traveled well beyond
and the neighboring states of
and
northern and eastern
from this accident. Health studies following the
accident have also confirmed the excess rates of thyroid cancer among
those exposed in childhood in the severely contaminated areas of
A nuclear exchange between
and
could lead to similar fallout effects.
In scenario 2,
,
Pakistan
civilians immediately. In scenario 3,
would
lose 115,000 civilians.
In scenario 2, surrounding areas of
lethal radiation could lose 300,000
civilians
as a fallout. In scenario
3,
Conclusion: Humanitarian,
Economic and the Larger Geopolitical Consequences of a Nuclear War in
South Asia
The devastating impacts of a
nuclear weapon targeted against a city go well beyond the immediate death toll.
The destruction of sanitation, refrigeration electricity, and water supplies
and services as a result of a nuclear explosion could lead to epidemics of
infectious diseases further compounding the problem. The breakdown of
communication and law and order would result in utter social anarchy, and the
emotional and psychological effects on the surviving population would pose
great challenges to rebuilding social networks even in the long-term.
The short and long-term social
consequences of a nuclear war in
are difficult to quantify. However, it is safe to assume that the humanitarian,
agricultural and economic consequences would affect the region and the world
for years to come. In the aftermath of a nuclear war, a large number of people
would attempt to flee the affected areas. The large influx of refugees to
neighboring countries could overwhelm regional governments and pose challenge
to international stability.
The findings of an India-Pakistan
war game conducted by the U.S. Naval War College in 1998 warned that a nuclear
exchange between the two countries would cause the world markets “to go into a
tailspin, driving capital out of emerging markets to seek safe haven in the
States
institutions would be pressed to resolve the resulting financial crisis.”[xliii]
One of the participants of this war game, former Assistant
Deputy Secretary of State Paul Taylor, later predicted that in the aftermath of
a nuclear war in
Asia
“severe shortages of food and potable water could exceed the capacity of relief
organizations to respond and might even stress international markets.”[xliv]
Paul Taylor further
stressed that the humanitarian and economic crisis that would follow a nuclear
war in
Asia
would be unparalleled in history. A conference of international donors would be
required to mobilize many billions of dollars needed for relief efforts. The
prices of certain commodities, especially foods, could skyrocket and could
trigger a global recession.[xlv]
i
See Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and
Secession:
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Press, 1990.
ii
Lee Feinstein, “Avoiding Another
Close Call in
Control Today, July/August 2002.
iii
“Challenges and Opportunities for Nuclear
Disarmament in South Asia,” Statement by
Admiral L. Ramdas, Former Chief of the Indian
Navy, To the Preparatory Committee
Meeting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, New York, NY,
April 2002.
iv
Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil
2002, Center for the Advanced Study of India-University of
v
Strobe
Talbott, quoted by
Lee Feinstein in “Avoiding
Another
Close Call in
Control Today, July/August 2002.
vi
Statement by Home
Minister, Mr. L. K.
Advani
on the
Terrorist Attack on the Parliament House on December 13, 2001,
Parliament, December 18, 2001.
vii
“
of War” Wall Street Journal,
“India’s Leader Steps up War Rhetoric,” Washington
Post,
viii
Statement of Pakistani President
Pervez
Musharraf, May
27, 2002.
http://www.pak.gov.pk/public/presidentadress-27-5-2002.htm
ix
Interview with Defense Minister George
Fernandes,
Hindustan
Times,
x
Julian Borger, “Nuclear war could kill 12 million,
says
Guardian,
28, 2002
xi
Shannon N. Kile,
“Pakistani Nuclear Forces,” and “Indian Nuclear Forces,” The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Project on Nuclear Technology &
Arms Control, January 2003.
http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/pakistan.pdf
and http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/india.pdf
xii
The Natural Resources Defense Council, “The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict
between
and
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp
xiii
Bruce G. Blair, “The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War,” The Brookings Institute:
Started Accidental Nuclear War,” The
Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation, 1998.
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/anwindex.html
xiv
M.V. Ramana,
“A nuclear wedge,” Frontline, Vol.18,
Issue 25, Dec. 08 -21, 2001.
xv
Ibid.
xvi
Pervez
Hoodbhoy, “India-Pakistan: What, Us Worry?,”
Los
Angeles Times,
2002
xvii
Fredric Solomon and Robert Q
Marston, editors,
The Medical Implications of Nuclear War, Institute of Medicine, The
National Academy of Sciences, Washington DC, 1986, page xiii.
xviii
The Natural Resources Defense Council, “The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict
between
and
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp
xix
Ibid.
xx
“General Principles of Nuclear Explosions,” Chapter I in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, edited and compiled by Samuel
Glasstone
and Philip J. Dolan, prepared and published by the United States Department of
Defense and the Energy Research
And
Development Administration,
xxi
Ibid.
xxii
Ibid.
xxiii
“Descriptions of Nuclear Explosions” Chapter II in The
Effects of Nuclear
Weapons, edited and compiled by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan.
xxiv
Matthew McKinzie, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and A.H. Nayyar, “Nuclear
War in
Asia
Foreign Policy in Focus, Policy Report, June 2002. http://www.fpif.org/papers/nuclearsasia.html
xxv
Ibid.
xxvi
Ibid.
xxvii
Ibid.
xxviii
Ibid.
xxix
Ibid.
xxx
Thom Shanker, “12 Million
Could Die at Once in an India-Pakistan Nuclear War,” New York Times,
xxxi
Ibid.
xxxii
M.V. Ramana, Bombing
Effects of Nuclear Weapons and a Case Study of a Hypothetical Explosion,
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,
xxxiii
Ibid.
xxxiv
Ibid.
xxxv
Matthew McKinzie, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and A.H. Nayyar, “Nuclear
War in
Asia
Foreign Policy in Focus, Policy Report, June 2002. http://www.fpif.org/papers/nuclearsasia.html
xxxvi
James Phillips, Jack Spencer, Dexter Ingram, and
Dana Robert Dillon, “Responding to the Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” The Heritage
Foundation:
DC
20, 2002
xxxvii
Ibid.
xxxviii
Ibid.
xxxix
Ibid.
xl
The Natural Resources Defense Council, “The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict
between
and
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp
xli
Ibid.
xlii
Colin R Muirhead, “Cancer after nuclear
incidents,” The Journal of Occupational Environmental Medicine, vol. 58, 482-488, July 2001.
xliii
Bradd C. Hayes, “
International
Game’ 99: Crisis in South Asia,” Game Results and Policy
Recommendations, the
College
www.nwc.navy.mil/WARDEPT/sapp_rpt.doc
xliv
Paul D. Taylor, “
Unthinkable,” Naval
2001.
xlv
Ibid
THE CREDIBILITY PROBLEM*
Peter
Lavoy_____________________________________________________________
Peter Lavoy
is the director of the Center for
Contemporary Conflict and Co-Director of the
Regional
Security Education Program. At the Naval Postgraduate School, he also is
Assistant Professor and Associate Chair for Research in the National Security
Affairs Department, where he has been since 1993. He served as director of Counterproliferation
Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1998 to 2000. In
addition, he participated in the Department’s war plans review and in its
efforts to craft
toward
of their 1998 nuclear tests. For these efforts, Dr. Lavoy
received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service. He
has published numerous articles and book chapters on weapons proliferation and
on South Asian security issues. He co-edited
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons(
2000). His next book is Learning to Live with the
Bomb:
Weapons, 1947-2000.
When it comes to deterring direct
nuclear attack against the core territory of either
or
foolish enough to doubt that such an attack would be met with a swift and
devastating nuclear counterattack. The real credibility problem arises with
respect to deterring limited military challenges, whether in the form of
frequent, small-scale military intrusions across the Kashmir Line of Control
(LOC; as occurred in
Siachen
in 1984 and
Kargil
in 1999i),
support. As Indian defense analyst Raja
Menon
put it, the
Kargil
conflict in particular, “demonstrated that the
Subcontinental
nuclear threshold probably lies territorially in the heartland of both
countries, and not on the
cease-fire
line.”
ii
This is why
immediately mobilized for war after terrorists attacked the parliament building
in
in 2001, but were relatively restrained when Pakistani forces infiltrated into
the
Kargil
heights in Indian-held
in 1999. How then do
and
credibly signal their preparedness to respond to limited military challenges at
the conventional or
subconventional
(guerilla) levels with punishing force?
In the past few years, Indian and
Pakistani officials have resorted to various kinds of signals to communicate
their resolve to respond to limited military challenges. These signals also
have been designed to convey their interest in keeping conflict limited, and
sometimes to communicate their interest in resolving the crisis. In some cases,
Indian or Pakistani leaders intend to convey only one message to one audience,
usually to the other side’s leadership. In other cases, signals are intended to
reach multiple audiences, such as the domestic population, the
government, and other third parties. In other circumstances, multiple messages
are intended, sometimes to multiple audiences. These signaling efforts can be
divided into two categories: direct communication and tacit communication.
Direct communication has included:
(1) private statements made either through formal government channels, such as
embassies, or through back-channel communications among government-appointed
representatives; (2) private statements made to third parties, such as the
government; and (3) public statements made by civilian and military officials.
For various reasons, direct communication is often incomplete, sometimes
extremely difficult, and at other times not desirable. Under any of these
circumstances, the Indian and Pakistani governments have resorted to tacit
bargaining (or tacit communication). The three most prominent types have
included force deployments, missile tests, and military firing across the
Kashmir LOC. At times of crisis, tacit bargaining might be even more reliable
than direct communication because the signals would be taken much more
seriously.
Tacit communication through risky
military conduct has become commonplace in
populations of
and
and usually always distressing to the international community, this behavior is
a logical response to the strategic predicament in which
and
now find themselves. The presence of nuclear weapons has not altered the desire
of
and
to “win” crises, but it has strengthened their interest in avoiding war. This
condition creates a paradox.
and
would appear to have every incentive to exhibit prudence during a crisis and
avoid potentially catastrophic escalation, but at the same time, to reinforce
their reputations for resolve, they have powerful new incentives to run risks
and to stand firm in the face of the other side’s risky behavior. Faced with
similar circumstances during the Cold War, the
States
and the
raised their “provocation threshold” (that is, the level at which provocative
political or military moves might provoke a military response) and devised
creative, new options to exercise coercion short of war. The same pattern is
now apparent in
intrusions, and costly force deployments now almost everyday occurrences.
government officials believe that these costly, reputation-enhancing signals
are reckless. Indeed they probably are. But they also are driven by the logic
of the strategic situation. American policymakers who cannot understand why
Indian and Pakistani leaders run such dangerous risks suffer from selective
memory loss, for the
and the
turned similar risk taking into a well-rehearsed form of art early in the Cold
War. Whereas
and
learned to temper their strategic competition after the Cuban missile crisis,
Delhi
and
do not appear to have undergone a parallel nuclear learning process—even though
the 2001-2002 composite military
crisis
might have been regarded as their “Cuban crisis.” As a result, American
exhortations to “reduce nuclear risks” are likely to ring hollow to the Indians
and Pakistanis who recall
and Soviet strategic conduct during the Cold
War.
iii
Moreover, in many respects both Indian and Pakistani policymakers believe that
their strategies of brinksmanship worked well during the 1999
Kargil
conflict and the 2001-2002 composite military crisis. Indians believe that the
application of intense force against the intruders in the
Kargil
heights, coupled with credible threats to widen the conflict if necessary,
compelled
to withdraw its remaining forces. Many Pakistanis feel that while they agreed
under heavy
pressure to vacate their well defended mountain positions, they deterred
from expanding the conflict by signaling their willingness to respond to Indian
escalation with conventional, and possibly nuclear, counterattacks.
As noted above, after terrorists
attacked India’s parliament building in December 2001, Indian Prime Minister
Atal
Bihari
Vajpayee ordered the full mobilization of Indian armed forces and told them to
prepare for a major attack against Pakistan, which Indian intelligence services
assessed was behind this and other terrorist attacks on Indian soil. The
Pakistanis claimed that they again “deterred” Indian plans to attack in the
early winter and summer of 2002.iv
This interpretation gained even more credibility in light of President
Musharraf’s
statement on December 30, 2002, that war with India was averted because of his
repeated warnings that should Indian forces cross the border, Pakistan’s
response would not be confined to conventional warfare. Although
President
Musharraf
did not specifically mention the threat of nuclear weapons in his speech to an
army corps reunion in Karachi, he did state that he was prepared to take severe
military measures at the height of the 2002 crisis: “In my meetings with
various world leaders, I conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the Line of Control and the
international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from
Pakistan.”
Musharraf
added, “I believe my message was effectively conveyed to Mr.
Vajpayee.”
v
Despite the fact that war was only narrowly averted in 2002, Pakistani military
planners now appear to have even more confidence in their ability to manage the
risks of conventional-nuclear deterrence. Similarly, Indian officials believe
that their major military mobilization coerced
Musharraf
into at least temporarily abandoning his support of “cross-border terrorism”
and made the United States more sensitive to the issue of terrorism in Kashmir
and elsewhere on Indian territory.
Because major war was avoided in
South Asia’s recent crises, and because officials in New Delhi as well as in
Islamabad “learned” that their strategy of brinkmanship paid off, it is likely
that during the next crisis each side will resort to new forms of risky
military behavior to signal their reputations for resolve, to score limited
gains, and, hopefully, to avert a nuclear war. Although the Indian and
Pakistani governments will go to great lengths to keep the United States at
arm’s length from their strategic planning processes, lest Washington try to
apply unwanted
pressure,
vi
U.S. officials can and should try to play a constructive role in Indian and
Pakistani efforts to bring their political and military conduct in line with
the imperatives of nuclear ownership. We are all fortunate that a major war did
not break out in 1999 or 2002, but U.S. policymakers would be prudent to help
India and Pakistan head off the next serious military crisis lest it trigger
the war that nobody wants.
i
For background of the conflict,
see V.R.
Raghavan,
Siachen: Conflict
Without End,
ii
Raja
Menon, A Nuclear
Strategy for
India
Delhi
iii
The policy objective of reducing nuclear risks is identified in U.S. Department
of State and U.S. Agency for International Development,
Security, Democracy,
Prosperity:
Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004-2009.
iv
For example, see “Are Pakistani Nukes More Effective
Than
Indian?” Daily
Times (
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=story_13-12-2002_pg1_11
v
“
Was Warned of Unconventional War,”
Nes
International,
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2002-daily/31-2002/main/main2.htm
vi
For background on this point, see
Feroz
Hassan
Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability
Dilemmas in
Control Today, 33, no. 8 (October 2003).
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD*
Michael
Krepon
_________________________________________________________
Michael Krepon is the Founding President of
the
Center
International Peace. He is the author of
Strategic Stalemate, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics
(1984), and Arms Control in the Reagan Administration (1989), and he is
co-editor of Verification and Compliance, A Problem-Solving Approach (1988), Crisis
Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995), and
Global Confidence-Building: New Tools for Troubled Regions (1999). His newest
books are Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and Space Assurance or
Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing
Space (
L.
Stimson
Center
work has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and
the
Indian
and Pakistani government officials and strategic analysts assert that they will
not fall into the traps of US–Soviet competition. To avoid these traps,
restraint in deployments and force sizing is necessary, but insufficient. Nor
can national leaders hope to succeed at nuclear risk reduction solely by
undertaking unilateral actions to improve command and control and cross-border
monitoring. Successful nuclear risk reduction in southern
States
and
unilateral actions.
The
rhetorical declarations of peaceful intent and negotiated confidence-building
measures (CBMs) that
and
have relied upon instead of treaties provide a completely inadequate basis for
nuclear risk reduction. Rhetorical pronouncements have usually been advanced to
place “the other” at a political
disadvantage.
i
The
impulse for negotiating
CBMs
has usually followed wars or crises on the Subcontinent and waned after a
crisis has passed. The subsequent record of existing
CBMs—where obligations are initially honored, only
to be superceded by unrestrained military practices—hardly builds confidence.
In this context, “confidence-building” is designed primarily to assuage foreign
audiences that leaders in
are capable of managing their differences. But confidence-building is not
applied in any serious way to military interactions. Existing
CBMs
could provide a solid foundation for nuclear risk reduction—but only if there
is a sea-change in Pakistani and Indian implementation practices.
If
nuclear risk reduction is treated in the same cavalier, political fashion as
confidence-building, then
face a rough and dangerous passage. The introduction of overt, offsetting
nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles has clearly increased tensions and
risks in the Subcontinent, at least in the short run, as was most evident in
the intense, limited war fought in the heights above
Kargil
in 1999. How long this period of tension and risk extends depends, in large
measure, on how serious political leaders are in pursuing an alternative
course.
Serious
nuclear risk reduction is not possible in the absence of meaningful official
dialogue. Since the 1998 nuclear tests, substantive dialogue on nuclear matters
between
and
has been minimal. And for two years after the
Kargil
misadventure,
rejected official dialogue with
non-engagement runs at cross-purposes with the pursuit of risk reduction.
Given
the dismaying history of Indo–Pakistani interactions, it is understandable why
would believe that a policy to isolate
Kargil
and supporters of militancy in
would yield more benefits than a dialogue on nuclear risk reduction. But
than to
again prove to be barren, it is incumbent upon Indian leaders to try once more
to enlist
efforts.
Delhi
could facilitate greatly such a course by taking new initiatives to alleviate
tensions in
forces.
As
Pakistani officials repeatedly declare, nuclear risk reduction is inextricably
linked to tensions in
to the transit of militant groups based in
across the Line of Control. Those carrying out militant operations often
receive logistical, intelligence, and material support from
pry
from Indian control, but they have a high probability of isolating
and weakening its civil and democratic institutions. If
reduction agenda, they would need to dampen the fires of militancy in
of the Line of Control.
Typically,
when
and
have reached an agreement in principle, one or the other side has refused to
formalize it, wary of a domestic backlash. This pattern might well be
revisited, once bilateral discussions resume on nuclear risk reduction.
Near-term agreement on such matters as prior notification and directional
constraints on ballistic missile flight tests seem quite possible, given the
clear overlap between Indian and Pakistani risk-reduction
agendas.
ii
Another
indicator of seriousness would therefore be for Indian and Pakistani leaders to
promise their citizens to refrain from holding risk reduction measures hostage
to favored outcomes in
seriousness would be proper, sustained implementation of any agreements
reached.
i
See P.R.
Chari, “Declaratory Statements and
Confidence-Building in
Krepon, Jenny S.
Drezin, and Michael
Newbill
eds., Declaratory Diplomacy: Rhetorical Initiatives and Confidence-Building, Report 27
(Washington, DC: The Henry L.
Stimson
Center, 1999).
ii
See chapter 3 of this report, Chris Gagne, “Nuclear Risk Reduction in
CONCLUSION
The upcoming peace talks between
and
present a unique opportunity to enhance both communication and stability on
both sides of the conflict.
The present period of goodwill represents an
elusive negotiable moment; an opportunity for dialogue that may not be repeated
for several years.
It is vital, both now and in future negotiations, that every effort be made to
encourage confidence building, military protocol, and risk reduction measures.
The agenda must include increased dialogue, a hotline between
and
Delhi
or the escalation of hostilities. It is essential that policy makers from both
sides work together to establish protocol that will create a stable and
peaceful future.
The lives of literally millions of Indians and Pakistanis lie in the balance.
Biographies:
Chris Forster is a former Human Rights Violation Monitor at the Center for the
Prevention of Genocide. During his time at the Center he focused on conflict
and
and
Gaurav
Kampani is the Senior Research Associate at
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies. Before joining the Center,
he was a Herbert
Scoville
Peace Fellow at the Natural Resources Defense Council in
issues related to nuclear proliferation in
has an M.A. degree in International politics from
in
Washinton
is co-author of “Pakistan:
Shift Away from Indo-Centricism?,”
Dawn, 2001. He
also wrote an issue brief entitled, “Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why
It Isn’t
Over
Yet” in June of 2002.
Michael J.
Kopetski served as Congressman in the One
Hundred Second and One Hundred Third Congresses as a Representative from
to
He is best known as the co-author of the 1992 nuclear test moratorium
legislation that led to the halting of further testing. He
served as an aide to Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, 1973-1974. He also
worked as the committee administrator on the
legislature, 1977-1979. He was also
the co-author of,
“What did we tell you?
prove the need for test ban treaty,” Oregonian,
Michael
Krepon is the Founding President of the
Stimson
Peace, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter
Administration. He is the author of Strategic Stalemate, Nuclear Weapons and
Arms Control in American Politics (1984), and Arms Control in the Reagan
Administration (1989), and he is co-editor of Verification and Compliance, A
Problem-Solving Approach (1988), Commercial Observation Satellites and
International Security (1990), The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification
(1991), Open Skies, Arms Control and Cooperative Security (1992), Crisis
Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia (1995), and
Global Confidence-Building: New Tools for Troubled Regions (1999). His newest
books are Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future
(Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003), and Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case
Against
Weaponizing
Space (
Stimson
appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, and the
Washington Post.
He currently teaches in the Politics Department at the
of
Randy Lange is a Fellow with the Center for Prevention of Genocide. In
addition, he currently serves as a Senior Consultant with
Booz
Allen Hamilton.
In relation to nuclear deterrents,
Mr. Lange has worked with the U.S. Department of Energy, in partnership with
the former U.S.S.R., to help craft strategic disarmament related to the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
He has more than 9 years of experience in consulting, national security, public policy
and communications. He has two years of task leadership experience. He
has worked with a wide range of clients across the national security and
intelligence arena. Mr. Lange is
currently engaged on a project for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS). He has been a
contributing team member of a Social Network Analysis (SNA).
Additionally, he spent 4 years as an on-air, commercial television broadcaster. He
has an M. S. in Justice and Public Policy from
and a B. A. in Political Science/Communication from the
of
in
Peter
Lavoy
is the director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict and Co-Director of
the
Regional Security
Education Program. At the
Naval Postgraduate School, he
also is Assistant Professor and Associate Chair for Research in the National
Security Affairs Department, where he has been since 1993. He
served as director of
Counterproliferation
Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1998 to 2000. He served
as Co-Chair of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Working Group on Readiness
Standards and Reporting, Steering Committee Co-Chair of the NATO Senior Defense
Group on Proliferation (DGP), U.S. Chair of the U.S.-Israel
Counterproliferation
Working Group, and Co-Chair of the U.S.-Kuwait,
In addition, he participated in the Department’s war plans review and in its
efforts to craft
policy toward
and
in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests. For these efforts, Dr.
Lavoy
received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service. He
has published numerous articles and book chapters on weapons proliferation and
on South Asian security issues. He co-edited
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons(Cornell
University Press, 2000). His next book is
Learning
to Live with the Bomb:
and Nuclear Weapons, 1947-2000.
Richard O’Brien is the Founding Director of the Center for the Prevention of
Genocide. He also co-founded
Improve the World International and served as Chairman of the Board from
2000-2004. He has served as Editor
in Chief for the Center’s 27 Country Reports and four published journals. In
addition, he has appeared on T.V. and radio discussing genocide prevention.
Prior to founding these organizations, Mr. O’Brien lectured at the university level on
genocide and genocide prevention. He taught history at the
of the Arts in
and was named in “Who’s Who in Teaching
In
America” for his exemplary teaching. He holds an MA with a concentration in
Public Policy from
Ahren J. Schaefer is a Fellow at the Center for the Prevention of Genocide. He has
worked on genocide and conflict related issues occurring in
conducted research at the United Nations in
with concentrations in both Conflict Resolution and International
Law/Organizations at the
Acknowledgements
The Center for the Prevention of Genocide would like to give
special thanks to the authors
Gaurav
Kampani, Michael
Kopetski, Michael
Krepon, Peter
Lavoy, and
Jaya
Tiwari
for the articles they contributed to this report.
The Center also would like to thank The
Nonproliferation Review for permission to reproduce excerpts from its
past issues, as well as the
Stimson
for its permission to reprint “The Challenges Ahead.”
Furthermore, the Center would like to thank CPG staff members
Aisha
Bains, Rachel Davis, Julia Knight, Lauren Ready,
and Gretchen Schmaltz for their help in producing the report. Lastly,
the Center is indebted to
Jasha
Levenson
of Kinko’s of
for his aid in the printing of this report.
*
The Credibility Problem is an excerpt from
Managing South Asia’s Nuclear Rivalry: New Policy Challenges for the United
States. This article was originally published by Peter R.
Lavoy
in the Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2003.
*
The Challenges
Ahead is
an excerpt from Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is
Cold War Experience Applicable to
Southern Asia